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INTRODUCTION
The so-called Good Behavior Clause of Article III' could well be the most
mysterious provision in the United States Constitution -and that, of course, is
really saying something. While constitutional text was on occasion chosen for
the very purpose of avoiding the resolution of, rather than resolving, disputes,2
and while ambiguity permeates many of the most famed and controversial
provisions,3 rarely are a provision's purpose, scope, and methodology so totally
nonexistent to the naked eye.
Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University
School of Law. I would like to thank Abby Mollen of the class of2008 at Northwestern Law
School for her valuable research assistance and my colleagues Bob Bennett, Steve Calabresi,
and Andy Koppelman, as well as Dennis Murashko of the class of 2007, for their very
helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office.").
2. A number of such provisions appear in the judicial article concerning the extent and nature
of congressional power over federal court jurisdiction. See, e.g., id. cl. I ("The judicial Power
of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."); id. § 2, cl. 2 ("[T]he Supreme
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."). For analysis of these provisions, see
MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER 7-52 (2d ed. 199o).
3. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
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It is simply unclear, on the face of it, what the provision is all about. One
can search the text in vain for any indication of how the concept of "good
Behaviour" is to be defined, who gets to make that determination, and what the
method for implementation and enforcement of this provision actually is.
Moreover, the text provides absolutely no basis on which to attempt to
harmonize the Good Behavior Clause with the Constitution's other provisions
pertaining to the independence or control of the federal judiciary. Perhaps for
these reasons, both courts and Congress have largely ignored the provision,
choosing instead to focus the political control of the judiciary on the
constitutionally recognized congressional powers to regulate federal
jurisdiction4 and to impeach federal officers (including federal judges).'
Scholars, too, have focused on the Good Behavior Clause only rarely.6 For
these reasons Professors Saikrishna Prakash and Steven Smith, both noted and
respected constitutional scholars, are to be applauded for finally assuming this
scholarly challenge and responding to it with so controversial and innovative a
solution. In their article, How To Remove a Federal Judge,7 these scholars argue
that the Good Behavior Clause is constitutionally capable of playing a far
greater role in policing federal judges than it has played up to now. They
contend that the traditionally accepted view that impeachment provides the
exclusive constitutionally recognized means of removing federal judges from
office is "unpersuasive and ahistorical."8 The "better reading," they suggest, is
that under the Good Behavior Clause "officers with good-behavior tenure
forfeited their offices upon a finding of misbehavior in the ordinary courts. '
They see the Clause as providing a means for the political branches to regulate
4. See id. art. III, § 1,2.
s. See id. art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States,
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."); see also id. art. I, § 2, d. 5 (giving the House of
Representatives "the sole Power of Impeachment"); id. § 3, ci. 6 (giving the Senate the
power to try impeachments); Nixon v. United States, 5o6 U.S. 224 (1993).
6. There are, however, certain exceptions. Several scholars have, in fact, commented on the
relevance of the Good Behavior Clause to the control of the federal judiciary. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 TEX. L.
REv. 1, 65-70 (1989); Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of
the Judicial Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 35-42 (1998); Suzanna
Sherry, Judicial Independence: Playing Politics with the Constitution, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 795,
797-802 (1998).
7. Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How To Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72
(2006).
8. Id. at 75.
9. Id. at 77.
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the federal judiciary, above and beyond the impeachment power recognized in
Article II, Section 4. Moreover, they argue, the standard of improper judicial
conduct that justifies invocation of the Good Behavior Clause-while
concededly quite murky-must stand at a point that is distinctly lower than
that set by the "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" language of the Impeachment
Clause. ° The upshot of acceptance of their proposal would be the recognition
of a potentially dramatic expansion in the ability of the political branches to
remove from office federal judges protected by the qualified life tenure and
salary guarantees of Article II.1"
The Prakash-Smith article quite clearly represents the strongest possible
compilation of arguments to support so sweeping and radical a doctrinal
alteration in the constitutionally authorized practice for removing federal
judges. Close analysis, however, reveals that their historical arguments by no
means inexorably lead to the constitutional conclusion they reach. To the
contrary, a detailed critical review of those arguments shows them to be
counterintuitive, incomplete, or inconsistent with unambiguous historical
evidence. Ultimately, Prakash and Smith fail to meet their burden of historical
proof to show that those who drafted and ratified the Constitution intended,
by use of the "good Behaviour" language, to incorporate wholesale the
preconstitutional historical practice.
Far more problematic, however, is their deeper flaw: their failure to deal
adequately with the broad-and troubling- theoretical implications of their
suggested construction of the Good Behavior Clause for foundational notions
of American constitutionalism. Because their examination of the "trees" of
historical practice is so thorough and seemingly convincing,' 2 it is all too easy
to ignore the "forest": the extremely problematic effect that their proposed
interpretation would have on the vital role that federal judicial independence
necessarily plays in preserving the foundations of our political and
constitutional structure. Put bluntly, by substantially expanding the ability of
the political branches to remove, and therefore intimidate, members of the
federal judiciary, the Prakash-Smith proposal seriously endangers the ability of
the independent federal courts to police the constitutional excesses of the
political branches and to protect individual rights from majoritarian incursion.
By threatening the meaningful exercise of judicial review as a check on the
majoritarian branches-and make no mistake, that is undoubtedly the result
lo. Id. at 78 n.15.
11. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
12. But see infra Section L.B (challenging the implications drawn by Prakash and Smith from
their historical analysis).
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that the Prakash-Smith proposal would lead to 3-their suggested construction
of the Good Behavior Clause would dangerously upset the delicate balance of
checks and balances the Framers so wisely developed.
As a textualist, 4 I would be forced to accept their proposal were I convinced
that it represented the only reasonable construction of the applicable
constitutional text, regardless of how dangerous I believed it to be to the
foundations of American constitutionalism. After all, as Henry Hart once
asked, "Whose Constitution are you talking about-Utopia's or ours?""s But
even Prakash and Smith readily concede that their approach is not the only
reasonable construction of the text. To the contrary, they acknowledge that, as
a purely textual matter, one might believe that the Good Behavior Clause can
be read to be nothing more than a cross-reference to the standard for
impeachment described in Article II, Section 4. 6 So viewed, the language
would be designed simply to prevent possible confusion and conflict between
the otherwise unlimited judicial tenure dictated by Article III and the directive
of Article II subjecting federal judges to removal from office through exercise of
the impeachment power. 7
13. See infra Part II for an elaboration on the point.
14. See Martin H. Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial Review: The
Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 17-33 (1987). Prakash and Smith appear to
equate textualism with originalism, and they express puzzlement that one could claim to be
one without simultaneously being the other. Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, Reply:
(Mis) Understanding Good-Behavior Tenure, 116 YALE L.J. 159, 159 n.2 (20o6). But surely there
must exist some alternative between the straitjacket of an interpretative model restrained by a
usually fruitless effort to ascertain the narrow understanding of a group of drafters some
200 years ago, on the one hand, and utter linguistic chaos, on the other. Language need not
be devoid of any restraining impact on an interpreter for one to reject an arid, largely futile
attempt to constrain words by some narrow and unchanging historical perspective.
15. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectics, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1372 (19S3).
16. See Prakash & Smith, supra note 7, at 79.
17. See Martin H. Redish, Judicial Discipline, Judicial Independence, and the Constitution: A Textual
and Structural Analysis, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 673, 692 (1999). In their reply to this Response,
Prakash and Smith suggest that, absent the Good Behavior Clause, it would be impossible
to determine what federal judicial tenure would be. Prakash & Smith, supra note 14, at 168.
However, this ignores the hypothetical and contingent nature of the inquiry. It would be
absurd to assume that if the drafters had not included the good-behavior language, they
would not have inserted substitute language in its place providing for life tenure. In THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999), Hamilton
emphasizes the importance of tenure protection as an essential guarantee of judicial
independence. Moreover, in THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra, at 44o,
Hamilton expressly refers to the extent to which "permanency in office" contributes to the
independence of judges. Absent the good-behavior language, then, Article III would
undoubtedly have provided for life tenure, subject to the subsequently included
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When a textualist is faced with more than one linguistically plausible
option, the text can of course no longer control the ultimate interpretive choice.
Thus, in making that choice it is both necessary and appropriate for the
interpreter to attempt to determine what effect each of the alternative
constructions would have on both the textual framework of judicial
independence and the role that judicial independence is properly deemed to
play within the broader framework of American constitutional and political
theory. This, I believe, Prakash and Smith have failed to do, or at least to do
adequately.18  Instead, they have employed a form of "constitutional
isolationism," in which each provision is interpreted largely in a textual and
political vacuum, without any meaningful examination of how the chosen
interpretation fits within this more holistic constitutional structure. 9
There are, then, two different levels on which to critically assess the
Prakash-Smith interpretation of the Good Behavior Clause: narrowly, i.e., by
examining the text and its history in an interpretive vacuum, considering only
the words that appear within its four corners, and holistically, i.e., by
construing Article III's text as merely one element within a broader, organic
whole. It is my view that their suggested interpretation of the good-behavior
provision fails on both grounds. In Part I, I explain why their historical and
textual arguments fail on the narrow level. In Part II, I explain that the
Prakash-Smith construction of the Good Behavior Clause fails on the holistic
level because it is inconsistent with the role that judicial independence must
play for the system to operate effectively within the framework of American
constitutional and political theory.
impeachment power. Phrased this way, however, confusion might arise because of the
prima facie conflict between Article III's provision of life tenure and Article II's provision for
impeachment. Given this perspective, my argument that the good-behavior language was
included in Article III to prevent possible confusion between the otherwise unencumbered
life tenure in Article III and the provision for impeachment in Article I1 makes perfect sense.
In retrospect would it have been wiser, as Prakash and Smith suggest, Prakash & Smith,
supra note 14, at 168-69, to have employed somewhat clearer language? Definitely. But
similar criticisms could just as easily be made of numerous other constitutional provisions.
18. As explained in subsequent discussion, while Prakash and Smith do make some effort to
consider the broader implications of their analysis for the role that judicial independence
appropriately plays in the American constitutional system, it is, at best, a highly limited
effort that fails to recognize or deal with the full implications of their proposal. See infra Part
II.
ig. See infia Part II.
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE GOOD BEHAVIOR CLAUSE
A. The Prakash-Smith Argument
Professors Prakash and Smith make an elegantly simple argument to
support their position that the Good Behavior Clause provides a distinct
means, above and beyond the impeachment power, by which the political
branches may remove federal judges from office. They meticulously
demonstrate that, under established preconstitutional practice (on both sides
of the Atlantic), "good Behaviour" was a term of art, employed as a basis for
removing a wide variety of both public and private officeholders from office
through resort to the judicial process.2" Apparently, this practice had no clear
relationship to the wholly distinct process of impeachment. Thus, when the
Framers inserted the term "good Behaviour" as the qualifying standard on the
otherwise unlimited tenure of federal judges in Article III, it would be
"ahistorical,"21 Prakash and Smith believe, to construe the "good Behaviour"
language as simply a cross-reference to the "high Crimes and Misdemeanors"
standard for impeachment set out in Article II, Section 4, to which federal
judges are also subject.
While Prakash and Smith are certain that, as a historical matter, "good
Behaviour" represented a distinct, self-contained means for removing
officeholders above and beyond the impeachment power, they are far less
certain "about what constituted misbehavior."" They do suggest-without a
great deal of explanation-that the "'good Behaviour' provision.., seems more
general and less severe" in its standard for removal than does the "high Crimes
and Misdemeanors" language of the Impeachment Clause. 3 In defining the
"good Behaviour" standard in preconstitutional historical practice, they
occasionally refer to "[tihose who did not exhibit good behavior-i.e., those
who misbehaved." 4 This explication, however, is far from helpful. Although
they acknowledge that what constitutes constitutionally recognized
"misbehavior" under preconstitutional practice is "murky," they point to Lord
Coke's description of "three grounds for forfeiture: abuse of office, nonuse of
office, and refusal to exercise an office.""5 But at no point do they describe
20. Prakash & Smith, supra note 7, at 92-109.
21. Id. at 75.
22. Id. at 75 n.8.
23. Id. at 86.
24. Id. at 90.
25. Id.
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what, historically, counted as "abuse of office." More importantly, they fail to
explain how the historical understanding of "abuse of office" would translate
into the nation's modern political and constitutional structure. Could it today
possibly apply to judicial interpretation of the Constitution in a manner found
offensive, inaccurate, or politically unacceptable by members of Congress or
the President? On this issue, preconstitutional historical practice could not
possibly provide meaningful assistance, even if one were able to unearth it,
because the inquiry would be anachronistic. The American version of strong
judicial review, clearly contemplated by those who crafted the Constitution,26
simply did not exist at that point in time, particularly in England, where,
Prakash and Smith tell us, the concept of good-behavior tenure emerged.
Nor is Prakash and Smith's examination of history, as detailed as it is,
particularly helpful in explaining exactly how, under the American
constitutional system, the Good Behavior Clause of Article III is to be
implemented. To be sure, Prakash and Smith suggest that Congress may
invoke its authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article 127 to
enact statutes providing for judicial removal on grounds of misbehavior.28
However, that clause is not a freestanding grant of power. Both by its express
terms and venerable judicial doctrine, 2 that clause is purely catalytic and
facilitative of other, preexisting powers. Prakash and Smith fail to tell us
exactly which preexisting power of Congress or another branch of the federal
government the statutes would facilitate.3
Acceptance of the Prakash-Smith proposal would mean the following:
"good Behaviour" provides a distinct method, above and beyond
impeachment, for removing federal judges from office, at a standard of
misbehavior somewhat lower than that required under impeachment.
However, we know virtually nothing about how "good Behaviour" is to be
26. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); see also infra note 70.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cf. 18 (granting Congress power to "make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof').
28. Prakash & Smith, supra note 7, at 128-30.
2g. See, e.g., M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 324 (1819).
3o. Neither the congressional power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 9, to create lower federal
courts nor the Good Behavior Clause itself would seem to qualify, as the former provides no
removal power while the latter provides no power at all to any branch of the federal
government. While arguably the power to create courts logically implies the power to
abolish them, removal of an individual judge while leaving the existing judicial structure
unaffccted would seem to constitute a far more sweeping extension of this congressional
power.
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defined, who gets to define it either generally or in the individual case, or from
where Congress derives the constitutional authority to provide a statutory
mechanism by which to enforce the Good Behavior Clause.
B. Constitutional History and Good Behavior Reconsidered
I have no basis on which to question the detailed preconstitutional
historical description provided by Prakash and Smith concerning the use of the
"good Behaviour" standard for both public and private officer removal.3' Even
assuming the accuracy of their historical portrayal, however, there are a
number of significant gaps or flaws in their attempted linkage of that history
with modern constitutional interpretation of Article III's Good Behavior Clause
that may well render their historical inquiry of no modern relevance.
1. The Undefended Commitment to Originalism
In undertaking their painstaking preconstitutional historical analysis of the
"good Behaviour" concept, Prakash and Smith proceed on the largely
undefended premise that modern constitutional interpretation is appropriately
controlled by some form of originalism.3 In other words, regardless of the
outer reaches of constitutional text, modern normative analysis, or post-
constitutional sociopolitical developments, modern constitutional
interpretation is necessarily tied in the straitjacket of either original intent or
original meaning.33 However, this is by no means a universally accepted
interpretive position, either by scholars34 or jurists.3" Indeed, originalism has
31. Prakash & Smith, supra note 7, at 92-1o9.
32. Id. at 77 n.12.
33. There are two dominant forms of originalism: original intent (i.e., the intent of those who
drafted, framed, and/or ratified the document) and original meaning (i.e., the meaning
generally given to the terms employed in the Constitution at the time of its ratification). The
latter approach is the more recent of the two. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for
Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. REV. 611, 62o-29 (1999); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113,
1134-48 (2003).
34. See, e.g., Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 456-74
(1984); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 6o B.U. L. REv.
204 (1980).
35. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The
document that the plurality construes today is unfamiliar to me. It is not the living charter
that I have taken to be our Constitution; it is instead a stagnant, archaic, hidebound
document steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a time long past. This Constitution
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played an almost nonexistent role in much modern constitutional
interpretation. For example, the First Amendment's right of free speech, the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses' guarantee of
procedural due process, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause have each been construed by the modern-day Supreme Court without
any meaningful effort to ascertain either original intent or original meaning. 
6
One may question, then, why, all of a sudden, in construing Article III's Good
Behavior Clause the Supreme Court should be deemed bound by some archaic
inquiry into historical practice or Framers' intent, regardless of a proper
normative assessment of the clause's role in the American constitutional
system.
Strong arguments may be mounted against the originalist perspective. An
inquiry into original intent is problematic, simply because it is usually
impossible to ascertain some generalized intent of the drafters, framers, and
ratifiers of a provision. Moreover, even if such a determination were, in fact,
possible, it is by no means clear how that generalized intent applies to specific
applications, or how those responsible for the provision would view its reach in
light of 200 years of doctrinal and social developments.37 Finally, the words of
the document, not some nebulous framers' intention, were ultimately ratified
as law. Thus, the fact that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause may have assumed that separate-but-equal schools do not
contravene the requirements of equal protection should not bind modern
generations, when what they gave us was not a narrow, static understanding of
the text, but a broad-based, boldly drafted constitutional concept, capable of
normative growth and evolution.
The more recently developed original meaning school of constitutional
interpretation suffers from some of the same problems as the original intent
school, but includes also an additional difficulty. Instead of at least attempting
to view the Constitution as a holistic, purposive document, as the original
does not recognize that times change, does not see that sometimes a practice or rule outlives
its foundations. I cannot accept an interpretive method that does such violence to the charter
that I am bound by oath to uphold.").
36. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-49 (1976) (developing a utilitarian calculus
by which to measure procedural due process, without significant reference to historical
practice or Framers' intent); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (construing the
Equal Protection Clause to prohibit separate-but-equal school systems without relying upon
either practice at the time of ratification or Framers' intent). In the area of the First
Amendment's protection of free speech, even the most fervent judicial advocate of original
meaning has conceded that this interpretive approach is of no help at all, at least in certain
contexts. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
37. See Bennett, supra note 34.
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intent approach seeks to do, this school interprets individual words contained
in constitutional text largely in a purposive vacuum, divorced from any effort
to understand the document as a structural or contextual whole. As a result,
from this interpretive perspective the Constitution is viewed as something akin
to the Shakespearean texts that monkeys could type, were they allowed to type
long enough. Eventually, all of the words of Shakespeare would be typed, but
they would be merely random, unconnected words, divorced from any
calculated relationship to the words that came before or after.
It is true that many highly respected scholars today share the hermeneutical
perspective of original meaning adopted by Prakash and Smith. But many do
not. This is surely neither the time nor place to rehearse all of the arguments
for or against originalist interpretive theory. But at the very least, Prakash and
Smith should have acknowledged that the persuasive force of their arguments
in support of their suggested construction of the Good Behavior Clause relies
entirely on acceptance of a preexisting commitment to originalist interpretive
theory.
2. The Implications of Historical Practice for Interpretation ofArticle III
The argument that Prakash and Smith make in support of their
construction of the Good Behavior Clause effectively underscores the fatal
limitations of the narrow original meaning school. While their
preconstitutional historical description of the use of "good Behaviour" may be
assumed to be entirely accurate, they have failed to establish the requisite link
between that preconstitutional practice and the Framers' use of the term in
Article III.
The history described so effectively by Prakash and Smith clearly
demonstrates that the good-behavior requirement developed in
preconstitutional English practice not as a means of controlling officeholders,
but rather as a means of protecting their tenure. According to the Prakash-Smith
historical assessment, absent insertion of the good-behavior requirement, the
King would have been able to remove judges or other officeholders at his
pleasure. With the requirement, however, the officeholder must have been
found, through the judicial process, to have "misbehaved" before the King
could remove him. 8 The good-behavior requirement developed, then, as a
38. See Prakash & Smith, supra note 7, at 92-102.
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means of promoting government officeholder independence, not expanding the
available means for control and removal of officeholders.3"
Yet both the purpose and impact of the Prakash-Smith approach to good
behavior in Article III are to achieve the diametrically opposite result-namely,
to undermine the independence of government officeholders. When the "good
Behaviour" language is viewed as merely a cross-reference to the procedurally
and substantively protective impeachment standard, it serves much the same
purpose it was universally intended to serve (at least in the case of public
officeholders) in its preconstitutional historical context-i.e., to protect the
officeholder from unduly invasive and capricious treatment by those in power
that might compromise performance of his task. Indeed, Hamilton's relatively
brief references to the Good Behavior Clause in The Federalist No. 78 quite
clearly demonstrate that, in Hamilton's mind, its purpose was to protect
federal judges from intimidation, not to serve as an additional means of
controlling judicial behavior.40
Did the Framers clearly contemplate that good behavior in Article III was to
be a mirror image of the standard for impeachment in Article 11? It appears
likely that they failed to focus sufficiently on the issue to have any defined
perspective on the point. 4' But it is clear that they deemed an independent
judiciary to be an essential part of the American constitutional system. 42 It is
equally clear that they viewed impeachment as the requisite safety valve by
which to control the excesses of individual judges, as evidenced by Hamilton's
exclusive reliance on impeachment for this very purpose in The Federalist Nos.
39. This point concededly may not apply to historical extension of the good-behavior standard
to private officeholders, but for purposes of judicial independence and separation-of-powers
theory-which are all we are considering in the present context- it is absolutely true.
40. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 17, at 432 ("The standard of good
behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy is certainly one of the most
valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of government. In a monarchy it is an
excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier
to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body. And it is the best
expedient which can be devised in any government to secure a steady, upright, and impartial
administration of the laws.").
41. Prakash and Smith note that there is little specific reference to the "good Behaviour"
language in the Convention debates. Prakash & Smith, supra note 7, at 118.
42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 17, at 434 ("[The judiciary] is in
continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its co-ordinate branches;
and that as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and independence as permanency
in office, this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its
constitution, and, in a great measure, as the citadel of the public justice and the public
security.").
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79 and 81. 4 Indeed, the only references in The Federalist to the Good Behavior
Clause-and there are relatively few-are to the protective purposes the clause
serves in preserving judicial independence. When The Federalist refers to the
need to check the actions of federal judges, it refers explicitly to the
impeachment power. 44
Consistent with the view that the impeachment power was intended to be
the sole means of regulating judicial excess is the post-ratification history
concerning the Jeffersonian efforts to impeach Federalist Supreme Court
Justice Samuel Chase.4" The Republican effort to satisfy the high standards for
conviction in the Senate failed, following impeachment in the House of
Representatives. 46 If, as Prakash and Smith assert, the Good Behavior Clause
of Article III were generally understood both to provide an alternative means of
judicial removal and to impose substantively and procedurally lower standards
for judicial removal than did the Impeachment Clause, it is very puzzling why
the Republicans, obviously hellbent on intimidating the largely Federalist
judiciary, did not resort to that constitutional strategy. This is especially true
once their impeachment strategy failed.47
With Professor Steven Calabresi, Prakash has previously argued that post-
ratification practice should be considered in assessing Framers' intent only as a
43, E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 17, at 452-53 ("[It may be
inferred that] the supposed danger of judiciary encroachments on the legislative authority,
which has been upon many occasions reiterated is in reality a phantom .... [T]he inference
is greatly fortified by the consideration of the important constitutional check which the
power of instituting impeachments in one part of the legislative body, and of determining
upon them in the other, would give to that body upon the members of the judicial
department. This is alone a complete security.").
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 17, at 442 ("The precautions for
their responsibility are comprised in the article respecting impeachments. They are liable to
be impeached for malconduct by the House of Representatives and tried by the Senate; and,
if convicted, may be dismissed from office and disqualified for holding any other. This is the
only provision on the point which is consistent with the necessary independence of the
judicial character, and is the only one which we find in our own Constitution in respect to
our own judges."); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
45. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Most Endangered Branch, 1801-1805, 33
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 219, 249-59 (1998).
46. See Prakash & Smith, supra note 7, at 123.
47. Prakash and Smith argue that Congress strategically chose to use the impeachment strategy
in attempting to remove Justice Chase from office because reliance on the Good Behavior
Clause would have required resort to the judicial process, which they sought to avoid. Id. at
125. However, they provide no evidence that any Republican strategist at the time actually
employed such reasoning, or even considered the possibility. In any event, once the
impeachment strategy failed, resort to the Good Behavior Clause strategy would have surely
been better than nothing.
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last resort. 48 But that argument makes sense only for the purpose of excluding
strategically self-serving post-ratification practice-for example, the President's
assumption of additional power above and beyond that seemingly granted by
the text of Article I. Such self-serving practices are necessarily colored by
considerations of strategic political gain and therefore demonstrate little, if
anything, about the Framers' understanding. However, when the post-
ratification practice is strategically self-restrictive, as was the case in the
Republican failure to consider possible resort to the Good Behavior Clause in
the effort to remove Justice Chase from office, the practice is appropriately
deemed strongly probative of Framers' understandings. This is especially true
when-as in the case of the Chase impeachment-the practice occurs so
temporally close to the Constitution's drafting and ratification. Indeed, of
greatest significance is that apparently at the time of the Chase impeachment
no one even suggested resort to the Good Behavior Clause as an alternative
means of judicial removal. Thus, while Prakash and Smith attempt to
summarily dismiss the incident's relevance, 41 the simple fact remains: if those
who drafted and ratified the document understood that the Good Behavior
Clause was intended to create an alternative means of judicial removal, there is
no reason in the world why the Republicans would not have resorted to the
good-behavior alternative once their impeachment efforts had failed.
Ultimately, the Prakash-Smith historical argument fails because of a simple
lack of supporting evidence. While they seem to be capable of providing a
historical basis on which to establish some abstract preconstitutional
understanding of the good-behavior concept, Prakash and Smith are totally
incapable of demonstrating widespread contemporaneous consensus as to how
those words are to function when placed within the complex textual and
political setting of the Constitution. Nor are they capable of establishing that
either the Framers or the post-ratification Congresses understood that by
inclusion of the "good Behaviour" language, Article III was intended to employ
the Good Behavior Clause as a freestanding, less demanding means of
removing federal judges. This is true even though there certainly were
situations in which use of such a procedure would have been strategically very
helpful. Prakash and Smith have therefore failed to satisfy even the most
minimal burden of historical proof that logically rests on their shoulders.
48. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the Laws, 104
YALE L.J. 541, 550-59 (1994).
49. Prakash & Smith, supra note 7, at 125-26.
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II. GOOD BEHAVIOR AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
The gaps and flaws in the historical case made by Professors Prakash and
Smith are, unfortunately, the least of the problems with their proposal.
Whatever one thinks about the implications of the 1701 Act of Settlement,5" the
1779 discussion in Parliament,"1 the actions of the Pennsylvania Assembly in
17o6,52 or any other preconstitutional practice on which they rely, there exist a
number of fundamental elements of American political and constitutional
theory that their proposal severely undermines. Thus, the historical use of the
phrase "good Behaviour" prior to its insertion in Article III should make
absolutely no difference because acceptance of the Prakash-Smith proposal
contravenes the foundations of American constitutionalism. Put simply,
meaningful judicial independence is central to American constitutionalism, and
acceptance of the Prakash-Smith suggested interpretation of the Good
Behavior Clause would gut any meaningfill level of judicial independence.
A. Defining American Constitutionalism
The concept of American constitutionalism, as I use it, links two distinct,
albeit intertwined, levels of theoretical analysis. One is appropriately described
as "macro" and the other as "micro." Both represent essential elements of
American political and constitutional theory.
On the "macro" level, the phrase refers to the basic notion of limited
government, confined not solely by the will of the majority or the decisions of
the majoritarian branches of government, but also by a binding, written
constitutional structure, subject to revision, repeal, or amendment only by an
intentionally cumbersome supermajoritarian process. While this is surely not
the only form of democratic government a society could select, there can be
little question that, at some basic level, this is exactly the system we have
chosen. First, we chose to have our system of government laid out in a written,
rather than an unwritten, constitutive document. Second, by its express and
unambiguous terms the document's directives are framed as commands, rather
than as suggestions, recommendations, or pleas. Third, also by its express
terms, the document is subject to alteration only by a cumbersome
so. Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, discussed in Prakash & Smith, supra note 7, at 97-
100.
Si. See Prakash & Smith, supra note 7, at 99-1oo.
52. See id. at 103.
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supermajoritarian process. 3 Fourth, if the words contained within the four
corners of the document were for some reason deemed insufficient, the
unambiguous history of the framing of the document clearly demonstrates that
the intent of those who drafted it was to provide for a limited form of
government in which the growth of tyranny was to be virtually impossible and
minority rights were to be protected from the whims of majorities.5 4 The only
way these goals could even conceivably be achieved was through imposition of
a binding, written constitutional structure.
On a "micro" level, to maintain their legitimacy all democratic governments
must adhere to some form of social contract with their individual constituents.
The implicit understanding between them necessarily posits that government
will not employ its power in an arbitrary, invidious, or irrational manner
against the individuals to whom it is accountable. No truly representative
government could appropriately treat its citizens in any other manner.
Presumably for this reason, the Constitution (in its Bill of Rights) assures its
citizens that government may not deprive them of life, liberty, or property
without "due process of law." As an outgrowth of this commitment to due
process, the nation further committed itself to two fundamental postulates.
First, our judicial system must comport not only with the demands of
procedural justice, but also with "the appearance of justice.""5 Second, no
person can serve as a judge in her own case.s6 Without assuring that both of
these demands are satisfied, our system cannot satisfy the dictates of due
process that are imposed on us positively, by the terms of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, and normatively, by the very notion of legitimate
democratic government.
53. U.S. CONST. art. V.
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 17, at 468 ("This independence of
the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from
the effects of those ill humors which . ..have a tendency . .. to occasion dangerous
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the
community."); see also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 48, 51 (James Madison).
55. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14
(1954)).
56. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). The concept was famously invoked by Lord Coke in Dr.
Bonham's Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B.).
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B. The Role ofJudicial Independence in Satisfying the Demands ofAmerican
Constitutionalism
There can be little question that neither the macro nor the micro demands
of American constitutionalism can be satisfied when the very majoritarian
government body whose actions have been constitutionally challenged sits in
final judgment of the legitimacy of those actions. No more satisfactory would
be the vesting of the final power to resolve such disputes in the hands of those
who are subject to the direct control of that government body. As a practical
matter, such decisions would differ little from having decisions made by the
government body itself. At the very least, one most definitely could not be
assured of the appearance of justice under such circumstances, even if one were
to somehow assume the presence of actual justice.
On the macro level, recognition of this basic precept goes back to Hamilton
in The Federalist No. 78s7 and Chief Justice Marshall's famed opinion in
Marbury v. Madison.8 Both recognized that the practice of independent judicial
review was necessary to prevent "giving to the legislature a practical and real
omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers
within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that these limits
may be passed at pleasure."' 9 Acceptance of such an argument, Marshall
concluded, "reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest
improvement on political institutions - a written constitution.',
6o
On a micro level, the Supreme Court has long recognized that decisions
involving the potential loss of life, liberty, or property do not comply with the
requirements of procedural due process when the adjudicator stands to gain or
lose financially on the basis of her decision.61 This is so even absent any
concrete showing that the potential financial interest actually influenced the
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 17, at 435 ("The interpretation of
the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must
be regarded by the judges as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its
meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative
body.").
S8. 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137 (1803).
59. Id. at 178.
6o. Id.
61. The constitutional standard, according to the Court, is "possible temptation to the average
man as a judge." Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532. For a detailed examination of this precept in
Supreme Court doctrine, see Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory
Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 494-500 (1986).
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adjudicator's decision. 62 The obvious reason for so strict a constitutional
standard is the reasonable apprehension that otherwise the adjudicator's
decision would be deprived of all legitimacy in the eyes of the litigants. This
concern is intensified when the government is on one side of the case and the
adjudicator is potentially subject to its financial control depending on the
outcome of the case. Presumably, similar concerns led the Framers to impose
an unwavering prohibition on reductions in the salaries of Article III judges. 6,
C. Implications of the Prakash-Smith Proposal for Judicial Independence
Absent acceptance of the Prakash-Smith proposed interpretation of the
Good Behavior Clause, our structure of judicial independence looks roughly
like this: once appointed and confirmed, Article III judges sit for life, and their
salaries cannot be reduced; however, for the commission of "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors," they (like other civil officers) can be subjected to a difficult
two-House process of impeachment and removal. 6' The reference in Article III
to judicial tenure during "good Behaviour," in the non-Prakash-Smith world,
is construed as nothing more than a textual cross-reference to the impeachment
power set out in Article II, Section 4. It was presumably included to avoid a
confusing conflict between the seemingly unlimited tenure guaranteed in
Article III and the simultaneous presence of the impeachment power.
When one adds the Prakash-Smith proposal to this framework, we are left
with the following structure of judicial independence: much of the previously
described scenario concerning the role of impeachment would continue to
exist; however, some nebulous power in Congress to legislatively establish an
as-yet undefined judicial procedure by which Article III federal judges could be
removed, absent either the protections of the substantively demanding "high
Crimes and Misdemeanors" standard or the procedurally demanding two-
House supermajority process set out by Article I's impeachment method,
would also be recognized. We would have no clear concept of what activity on
the part of federal judges actually constitutes the absence of "good Behaviour,"
62. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 61, at 494-95.
63. U.S. CONST. art. III, S I. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra
note 17, at 440-41 (emphasizing the importance of Article III salary protections as a
guarantee of judicial independence).
64. U.S. CONST. art. II1, § 1; id. art. 11, § 4. I make no reference here to the controversial issue of
judicial discipline short of removal, though I have commented on that issue in the past. See
Redish, supra note 17, at 701-04. On the general issue, see Harry T. Edwards, Regulating
judicial Misconduct and Divining "Good Behavior"for Federal judges, 87 MICH. L. REv. 765
(1989).
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other than that it is some form of "misbehavior 6, or "abuse of office." 66
Moreover, whether Congress would possess unreviewable power to define the
concept, or whether Congress would be permitted only to set up the process
with the enforcing courts construing it, remains unclear. Indeed, whether
Congress's legislatively established definition of the phrase would constitute an
unreviewable "political question," effectively excluding the courts from
involvement in the definitional process, also remains unclear.6 z
The impact of this proposal on the judicial independence necessary for the
success of the two branches of American constitutionalism would be
devastating. At present, federal judges know that they may be removed only by
resort to an extremely difficult process and that as long as they stay in office
their salaries cannot be reduced for any reason. That removal process exists
simply as a safety valve in extreme cases. 68 Under the Prakash-Smith proposal,
in contrast, judges would know that not only their financial interests, 69 but
their very employment might well rest on the extent to which their decisions -
interpreting both constitutional and sub-constitutional federal law-offend
65. Prakash & Smith, supra note 7, at 134.
66. Id. at 9o-91; see supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. Prakash and Smith, in their reply
to this Response, assert that
as between impeachment by Congress and removal through a legal procedure for
misbehavior, it is arguable that the latter procedure affords more protection to an
accused judge. With impeachment, a judge can be removed by officials who act
and are expected to act as politicians, under a standard that (as Gerald Ford
famously remarked) can as a practical matter mean whatever Congress wants it to
mean, and without any possibility of appeal.
Prakash & Smith, supra note 14, at 161 (footnote omitted). For many of the same reasons I
oppose the Prakash-Smith proposal, however, I reject an unlimited construction of the
constitutionally prescribed grounds for impeachment. See Redish, supra note 17, at 677, 682-
86. In any event, what Prakash and Smith give us is not "good Behaviour" removal rather
than removal by impeachment; it is both. My point, simply, is that judicial independence is
threatened more when there exist two constitutionally recognized ways to remove federal
judges, rather than one. This is especially true when the added method of removal employs
a substantive standard that is avowedly lower than the existing method. See Prakash &
Smith, supra note 7, at 78 n.15.
67. In Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), the Supreme Court found the basis for
invoking the political question doctrine in the language of Article II, Section 4 vesting "the
power to try" officials in the Senate. For an attack on this extension of the political question
doctrine, see Redish, supra note 17, at 693-96. For support of this extension, see MICHAEL J.
GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS 118-38 (1996).
68. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 17, at 449-59.
69. See THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 17, at 440-43.
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those in political power.7" This would be true even if it were the enforcing
judges, rather than Congress, who were to exercise final say on the meaning of
"good Behaviour." Judges appointed by the current administration could then
use that power as a means of intimidating or removing judges appointed by
prior administrations that held political viewpoints in conflict with those of the
current administration.
Whether recognition of the political power under the Good Behavior
Clause advocated by Prakash and Smith would, in fact, be employed
retributively is, of course, largely beside the point. It is the impact of the fear
that it might be so employed on federal judicial decision-making, and the fear
on the part of the citizenry that the judges might be affected in their decision-
making, that could so dramatically disrupt the notion of American
constitutionalism and the social contract between democratic government and
private citizens that underlies that concept.
CONCLUSION
In their article, Professors Prakash and Smith argue that while judicial
independence is of course important, it cannot be unlimited." They therefore
conclude that acceptance of their proposed dramatic expansion of the political
control of federal judicial tenure is "the better" approach. 7' What they fail to
recognize, however, is that their proposal does not merely reduce judicial
independence by some limited amount. Rather, it effectively guts it, by failing
to place any outer limits on the reach of the club they are putting in the hands
of the political branches, to be held over the heads of the members of the
judicial branch.
More important is the fact that other than their contention that
preconstitutional historical practice somehow inexorably leads to acceptance of
their interpretation of the Good Behavior Clause, they never make any serious
attempt to explain why their approach is "better" than the generally accepted
70. Prakash and Smith contend that "good Behaviour" could not properly be construed to
include simple disagreement with judicial decisions. Prakash & Smith, supra note 14, at 162.
However, because they fail to provide a coherently confined, historically grounded
definition of the phrase in the first place, it is difficult to understand how they can reach this
conclusion with any level of confidence. Moreover, because our form of strong judicial
review, combined with a binding supermajoritarian written constitution, never existed
when "good Behaviour" developed in preconstitutional times, it is impossible to know with
any certainty how a judicial invalidation of legislative action deemed not to be reasonably
grounded in text or original intent would be treated.
71. Prakash & Smith, supra note 7, at 79.
72. Id. at 76-77.
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structure, under which federal judges have life tenure, subject in extreme cases
only to the complex supermajoritarian process of impeachment. Presumably, to
establish that their practice is "better," they would need to demonstrate that
there is some invidious judicial practice currently taking place that the
impeachment process is incapable of remedying, or at least has failed to remedy
to this point. But I am aware of no such practice. Has there been some recent
epidemic of wild judicial misbehavior that the impeachment process has been
ineffective in policing? Have the federal courts gone haywire in their
interpretations of federal law? Have federal judges been taking lunch breaks
that are too long? Have they been engaging in sit-in strikes? Unless I have
missed some memo describing such judicial debauchery, I do not believe any of
these events to have taken place. 73
I am able to come up with only two conceivable reasons to support the
Prakash and Smith approach, one hermeneutical and the other politically
normative. The first is the originalist argument that we must adopt their
interpretation of good behavior for the simple reason that that is what the
phrase meant at the time of drafting and ratification. But for reasons previously
discussed,74 their historical arguments are far less than persuasive. To the
contrary, they are counterintuitive, given the broader theoretical context in
which the "good Behaviour" concept was unambiguously employed by the
Framers. In any event, such rigid originalism should play no role in modem
constitutional interpretation. The second conceivable reason is that it is
necessary to empower the political branches in this manner, in order to enable
them to intimidate federal judges into confining their constitutional
interpretations to those that comport with the political and constitutional
views of the majoritarian branches themselves. On a theoretical level, such a
rationale directly undermines the very purpose of inserting the constitutional
protections of judicial independence in the first place. On a narrower political
level, I would just say to anyone who supports such expanded political power
over the federal judiciary: be careful what you wish for.
73. Prakash and Smith criticize me for "effectively reading [the Good Behavior Clause] out of
the Constitution as an independent constraint on judges." Prakash & Smith, supra note 14,
at 163. But this criticism completely begs the question, for the entire subject of our debate is
whether that clause is, in fact, "an independent constraint on judges" or instead merely a
textual cross-reference to impeachment, as I argue. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
74. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
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